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INTRODUCTION
M uch of international tax policy rests on judgments regarding the allocation of capital in response to tax differences among alternative locations. A primary objective of this paper is to assess the responsiveness to taxes of the locational choices abroad of U.S. multinational corporations (MNCs) . The empirical analysis is based on data from the U.S. Treasury 1992 corporate tax files, which cover the activities of more than 500 major U.S. manufacturing companies in 60 potential foreign locations. The results reported here rest on data aggregated for each country location, and they demonstrate that local average effective tax rates have a significant effect on the amount of capital that U.S. MNCs have in a given location. For a country with an open trading regime, the elasticity of total real capital with respect to a reduction in the host country tax rate that increases the aftertax return by 1 percent is about three.
A number of papers have analyzed the sensitivity to taxes of foreign direct investment (fdi) into and out of the United States. Early examples of this work based on aggregate data include Hartman (1984) , Boskin and Gale (1987), and Slemrod (1990) .
1 They have generally found significant tax impacts, but these studies suffer from two major limitations. One is that they relate the annual flow of fdi to the level of current or lagged tax rates. Basic models of firm behavior indicate that there will be a long-run equilibrium relationship between the stock of capital and the level of the cost of capital, not between the annual flow of new investment (or the change in the stock) and the level of the cost of capital. Therefore, a more appropriate analysis would either estimate a stock equation or demonstrate what adjustment costs and tax changes are relevant in determining annual changes in the stock. Furthermore, fdi, which is the change in direct equity abroad, is an inappropriate measure for real investment, because it may simply represent financing or repatriation behavior. Indeed, in their study of U.S. direct investment in Canada, Grubert and Mutti (1991b) find that variations in fdi and plant and equipment spending are virtually uncorrelated.
Studies based on real investment at the firm level, derived from Standard and Poor's Compustat, have asked somewhat different questions. Harris (1993) analyzes the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 based on a 0-1 categorization of firms expected to face a large increase in their tax burden. Cummins and Hubbard (1995) focus on the short-run response of U.S. firms investing abroad.
2 Devereux and Griffith (1998) are able to avoid some of the ambiguities that Cummins and Hubbard face in measuring changes in capital spending by considering the choice of U.S. MNCs to locate in three European countries over the period 1980-94. From all of these papers, however, it is difficult to derive implications for the way aggregate stocks and flows of capital will be affected by tax policy changes, such as those reported in the opening paragraph.
Two cross-sectional studies that evaluate the relationship between real capital stocks and local tax rates are most closely related to the present paper. In a study of U.S. manufacturing affiliates in 33 foreign countries based on 1982 data from The Benchmark Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad, Grubert and Mutti (1991a) find that a 1 percent reduction in the cost of capital increased the stock of U.S. owned net plant and equipment by 1.5 percent. Hines and Rice (1994) use that same data source but also include all non-bank affiliates in a larger group of countries. In two different formulations they obtain corresponding elasticities with respect to a 1 percent change in the cost of capital equal to 2.3 and 4.5. Because their country sample includes a large number of tax havens with tiny populations, however, there may be many cases in which the real capital owned by an affiliate incorporated in a low-tax location is actually used in a branch somewhere else.
This paper uses a different and more recent data source to carry out a cross-sectional analysis of the relationship between real capita stock and local tax rates. It confirms that the responsiveness of capital to taxes is substantial in many alternative specifications. This result continues to hold when very poor or very low tax countries are excluded from the group of potential locations. Also, it holds if the tax rate is represented by an average for 1990 and 1992, to avoid the noise of a measure calculated for a single year, or if it is adjusted for possible dependence on the amount of recent investment in a country.
Countries with more restrictive trade regimes obtain less of a benefit from lower tax rates in attracting U.S. investment. The tax responsiveness of investment declines. This is consistent with the importance of production for other foreign markets, because more restrictive trade regimes in-2 Their approach is most closely related to firm-level studies of domestic investment behavior, where aggregate analysis has been particularly unsuccessful due to problems of simultaneity in the determination of investment and the cost of capital. See Hassett and Hubbard (1996) for a survey of empirical, firm-level studies of domestic investment that yield short-run estimates of the response of investment to changes in the cost of capital.
crease the relative cost of exports. If current stocks of investment are used to weight the estimated responses for each trade regime, the corresponding overall elasticity is two.
A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
MNC investment generally occurs when a firm expects that locating production abroad will allow it to earn a higher return from some special expertise it possesses. Basic models that demonstrate the determinants of an MNC's optimal capital stock in a given country location are presented by Grubert and Mutti (1991a) and by Hines and Rice (1994) . These models generally depend upon a scale variable that reflects the size of the market to be served and upon the costs of capital, labor, and other variable inputs.
3 For a firm to earn the same after-tax return to capital in all locations, the before-tax cost of capital is higher in a location where a higher tax rate applies; a higher tax rate results in a smaller optimal capital stock. Other relevant variables include tariffs and transport costs and plant-specific fixed costs. Foreign production becomes a more attractive way of serving the foreign market as foreign production costs and plant-specific fixed costs are lower and as transport costs and trade barriers are higher (Horstmann and Markusen, 1992) .
The primary issue addressed in this paper is the responsiveness of the amount of real capital invested by MNCs in manufacturing affiliates in a given country to the rate of taxation on the income earned in that country. The data are aggregated over all firms in the country to create a single observation, as if there were a single firm. The choice of this firm in deciding where to invest among several competing locations to serve a given market might be expressed in the following general form:
where K j is amount of real capital located in country j, Y represents the scale of the market served, r is the common after-tax return earned in all locations, t j is the tax rate in country j, and X j represents all other variables that vary by location j.
There are insufficient degrees of freedom to consider each competing location separately, and a convenient simplification is to consider an average of these alternative rates. Expressing this relationship in a logarithmic form gives the following equation:
where t A is the average tax rate over all foreign locations, t US is the U.S. effective tax rate, and N is the number of relevant foreign locations. The role of host country taxation enters in the form (1 -t i ), which means that the coefficient b is an elasticity indicating the percentage change in capital located in country i in response to a 1 percent change in the after-tax return in location i for a given pre-tax return, or, equivalently, to a 1 percent change in the cost of capital for a given after-tax return.
This formulation assumes that the competition offered by other locations, apart from the United States, is fully represented by the number of potential locations, N, and their mean tax rate. If the number of potential foreign locations is large, the average tax rate is the same regardless of which country i is considered. The impor-tance of this average tax rate and the U.S. tax rate then are subsumed in the constant term, because they are fixed in the cross section. Although the two different relative tax rates are explicitly shown in equation [2] to indicate that the capital located in country i may be attracted from other foreign locations and from the United States, the two log(1 -t i ) terms can be grouped together:
which is the equation estimated by ordinary least squares in this study. 4 Equation [3] expresses the desired capital stock in country i as a function of the host country tax rate and the vector of country characteristics. Of course, potential locations may not be regarded as equally likely, due to differences in the proximity to the relevant market or the availability of particular factor endowments. That possibility is considered by introducing a set of regional dummies for North America, Latin America, Asia, and the EC. These dummies are entered as independent variables and are also interacted with the tax rate to assess whether there is greater sensitivity to taxes in neighboring locations with access to the same market.
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With respect to other country characteristics, gross domestic product (GDP) and GDP per capita are included as possible indicators of the size of the domestic market, where the latter variable is particularly relevant for goods whose demand is income elastic. Higher per capita income may also reflect a more skilled labor force that can be employed in high-technology industries, and we attempt to measure that effect independently by including a human capital variable that gives the percentage of the university-age cohort who receive higher education. An indicator of openness of the economy is entered as an independent variable and also interacted with the tax variable, in order to assess whether countries with more restrictive trade regimes and less potential to benefit from a more competitive position in export markets get less benefit from lower tax rates.
RELEVANT CONCEPTS OF TAXATION
The income tax rate used in the empirical analysis is the observed average rate for a given host country. An important consideration is the potential superiority of Hall-Jorgenson marginal effective tax rates. Unfortunately, such marginal tax rates are not available for all of the 60 4 OLS estimation assumes that the error terms from each of the country observations are independent. If the error term from investing in one location were correlated with the error term from investing in another location, the precision of the resulting estimates could be overstated. That issue cannot be addressed in the current aggregate framework for a single year. Another issue is that the tax variable may simply be a proxy for unmeasured country-specific effects. In a cross-section for a single year, this possibility cannot be addressed directly. In a follow up to the present paper, Altshuler, Grubert, and Newlon (1998) report a preliminary analysis that looks at aggregate data on capital stocks for two different years, 1984 and 1992. Over this eightyear interval substantial variation in tax rates within individual countries has occurred, which warrants considering how changes in tax rates are related to changes in capital allocations. Such an approach can control for country-specific nontax factors that do not change at the same time. The magnitude and significance of the tax variable did not fall in this framework. 5 Including a regional dummy and its interaction with the host country tax variable implies that the observed response to the host country tax rate depends upon the difference between the rate in that country and the mean for the region. Countries not included in the regional dummies are a heterogeneous group that includes South Africa, Nigeria, Israel, and Morocco. Also, see Hines (1996) for a related treatment of real capital invested by foreigners across states in the United States. He represents the competing tax in alternative locations by a weighted-average rate based on the size of business activity in each state, a measure that ignores regional effects within the United States but does vary for each state considered.
countries in the analysis. Furthermore, the Hall-Jorgenson-King-Fullerton (HJKF) type generally are based on a limited number of features of the tax system, in particular the statutory tax rate, the amount of accelerated depreciation on tangible investments, and investment tax credits. In many host countries companies are offered special ad-hoc deals that are difficult to identify simply from basic statutory provisions. In contrast, the country average tax rates computed from the Treasury files reflect all provisions of the tax system as well as special arrangements.
Because of the importance of the taxation of infra-marginal rents that can be earned from production in a given location compared to their taxation in alternative locations, the average tax rate may even be the preferable indicator of the incentive to locate in a country. Another potentially relevant issue is whether there is a residual tax due in the United States, which in turn depends upon the parent's expected foreign tax credit position. Under U.S. law, active foreign income received by U.S. corporations is taxed when repatriated, with a credit for foreign taxes including both withholding taxes and the underlying foreign corporate tax on equity income if the U.S. company owns at least 10 percent of the foreign company. The credit for foreign tax is limited, however, to what the U.S. tax would be on the equivalent income.
If the parent company does not expect to have excess credits, then the residual U.S. tax on potential repatriations may become relevant. Hartman (1984) and Sinn (1993) have claimed, however, that the repatriation tax should be irrelevant for investment by a mature controlled foreign corporation (CFC), in an analysis that parallels the irrelevance of individual income taxes on dividends in the "new view" in a domestic context. If residual U.S. taxes are relevant, they will tend to narrow tax differentials between locations because the U.S. repatriation tax would be higher on distributions from low-tax countries.
If the firm expects to have excess credits, then the marginal effective tax rate on equity income is the host country rate, including withholding taxes on any distributions. Interest and royalties, however, which are generally deductible in the host country, will be exempt in the United States because they are foreign source and can be shielded by the excess credits. A CFC may respond to a high statutory tax rate by increasing its debt-to-asset ratio, or by paying more royalties to the parent, thereby generating greater deductible expenses in the host country and diluting the deterrent effect of high local taxes. Ignoring residual U.S. taxes and debt finance, and using only the local tax rate, may bias downward the estimated tax responsiveness of MNCs, because the variation in the tax burden across locations is less than implied by the local rate.
DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
The principal data base was the linked Forms 1120, 5471, and 1118 for 1992. Form 1120 is the basic U.S. corporate income tax return and provides information on the parent's income, expenses, and assets. The Form 5471 is an information return that MNC parents are required to file for CFC that gives its earnings and profits, balance sheet, sales, foreign taxes paid or accrued, and transactions with affiliates. A CFC is defined as a foreign company, more than 50 percent of which is owned by U.S. shareholders. 6 The Form 1118 is used by a parent MNC when claiming a foreign tax credit to reduce its U.S. tax liability.
The MNC parents in the sample are all U.S. companies in manufacturing with total assets in excess of $500 million that have at least one CFC. Altogether there turned out to be 561 parent companies whose data were available. Sixty potential foreign locations were used in the analysis, which were all the countries with more than five manufacturing CFCs in 1990. 7 The analysis was restricted to manufacturing CFCs of manufacturing parents.
CFC assets on the Form 5471 balance sheet are reported according to general U.S. accounting principles. They are not distorted by host country incentives such as accelerated depreciation. They are historical book values, however, which can be distorted by inflation. This disadvantage of using historical book values may warrant attention to the number of companies that choose to locate in a country, without considering the amount invested there, or to the sales made from that location.
Average host country corporate tax rates are derived from the Form 5471s by taking total income taxes paid by manufacturing CFCs incorporated in that country divided by their total "Earnings and Profits." The latter, defined in the Internal Revenue Code, is intended to reflect net economic income, not host country (or domestic U.S.) taxable income, which is affected by incentives such as accelerated depreciation. In this calculation, only those CFCs with positive income are included, because otherwise the tax measure will be biased upward. This approach yields 60 country average effective tax rates; firm-specific rates are not calculated, because they are not known for locations that are not chosen or where negative profits are earned.
Data for GDP and population (in 1990) 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Ordinary least squares estimates of equation [3] based on the 60 country locations where at least five MNC manufacturing affiliates operate are reported in Table 1 . Column 1 shows that average effective tax rates have a significant effect on the amount of capital invested in a country. The elasticity with respect to a 1 percent change in the cost of capital, or a 1 percent change in the after-tax return for a given pre-tax return, is 3.23 for countries with the most open trade regime. For those countries the interaction of the tax rate with the trade regime is zero and therefore irrelevant in determin- The second column of Table 1 allows an assessment of whether there is a magnified impact of low tax rates on capital allocation decisions, rather than a constant proportional effect as assumed with the log (1 -t) specification. The inverse (0.1 plus the average effective tax rate) is used as the tax variable, where the somewhat arbitrarily chosen value 0.1 avoids the extreme values that otherwise would be created at very low tax rates. In this form, taxes are more significant statistically and the overall equation has more explanatory power. The magnified sensitivity at low tax rates may represent a response to the incentive to shift income to low tax countries. Note that the coefficient on the trade openness variable is now positive, but its interaction with the tax variable still shows that restrictive policies weaken the response to low taxes.
The regression in column 3 uses the 1992 effective tax rate that has been adjusted for differences in the age composition of the companies in each location. Such an adjustment corrects for a potential bias or endogeneity of the average effective tax rate, because that rate is likely to be lower if there has been a large amount of recent investment. Large recent investments that benefit from investment tax credits would be particularly likely to indicate a spurious relationship between low tax rates and a large amount of capital in a location. Although the current analysis deals with the stock of capital and not the yearly change, the book value of capital nevertheless may be affected by large recent investments, too.
Examination of the individual CFC data indicates that there is a clear age effect; CFCs incorporated recently have significantly lower effective tax rates than the country average. Although one way to control for endogeneity is to apply an instrumental variable approach that gives a predicted value of taxes based on their relationship to another country-level exogenous variable, a preferable approach here, given our access to firm-level data, is to make an hedonic adjustment of the tax variable. Based on the coefficients from CFC-level regressions of affiliate taxes on the affiliate's age, and using the age distribution of CFCs in each country, we construct an "adjusted" effective tax rate not distorted by a large flow of recent investments in some countries. The corresponding coefficient estimate of 3.13 shows that the estimated tax responsiveness of capital is hardly affected.
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Column 4 uses a tax variable based on the average of the 1992 and 1990 effective tax rates, a measure that is less subject to the probability that a firm will locate in a given country and also increasing the amount of capital it chooses to locate there yields a combined elasticity of the expected amount of capital equal to about three. Firm-level analysis for separate industries also reveals differences in tax sensitivity that conform to expected differences in mobility: the location of computer and electronics companies is highly responsive to local tax rates, while taxes appear to have no effect on the choice of location in food and drugs, areas where local brand names, regulations, and price controls are likely to have a greater influence on firm location. Finally, micro data provide an opportunity to incorporate the role of the parent's foreign tax credit position. When a dummy variable that indicates whether the parent is in an excess credit position is interacted with the host country tax rate, it has no significant effect on the firm's locational choice. In fact, there are differences across firms in their potential mobility internationally, and the firm's tax sensitivity seems to determine its excess credit position and not the reverse. For example, computer companies, which tend to be in excess limit, are much more sensitive to taxes than petroleum companies, which tend to be in excess credit. 9 The age coefficients derived from the CFC-level analysis would be expected to yield much more precise estimates of age effects than simply adding the average age of CFCs as an independent variable in a location regression, because of the large variation of CFC ages within a location but relatively modest differences in average age across locations. As another attempt to control for timing and composition effects that may cause distortions in the average effective tax rate, we replaced that tax variable with the exogenously given statutory tax rate. That procedure is similar to using the statutory tax rate as an instrument for the average effective tax rate. The corresponding coefficient estimate is 1.91, significant at the 4 percent level.
random influences of a single year and more likely to represent the long-run equilibrium relationship sought in crosssectional analysis. The estimated elasticity with respect to (1 -t) goes up somewhat and is more significant. Host country GDP, GDP per capita, and the regional dummies, which are indicators of the relevant market size, all have significant coefficients. The human capital measure never is significant, and the only effect of including it is to reduce the significance of the GDP per capita coefficient. Therefore, we omit it from the table. Also, the interaction of the regional dummies with the tax term is only significant in the case of the EC, and those results are omitted, too.
In the final column of Table 1 the dependent variable is the number of U.S. affiliates located in the country, 10 which demonstrates another aspect of the location decisions of firms and addresses any potential reservation over the measurement of capital. The coefficient of the tax variable is 1.3, which indicates that a 1 percent decline in the cost of capital leads to a 1.3 percent increase in the number of affiliates located in the country. If the total capital response figure reported in the other columns is thought of as the product of the number of affiliates and the average amount of capital invested per affiliate, taxes can be seen to influence both elements of the total effect. Table 2 indicates how sensitive the Table  1 aggregate results are to the exclusion of certain locations. Apart from our usual concern that the high tax responsiveness observed may be due to a few idiosyncratic countries, this approach also addresses the possible bias from including tax-haven countries where firms choose to incorporate even though their capital assets are used outside of that country. Regressions using both the 1992 effective tax rate and the 1990-92 average are given. The first two columns exclude the countries with the highest and lowest 1992 effective tax rates. The results are little different from the comparable ones in Table  1 . The next two columns exclude the five locations with average effective tax rates below 7.5 percent. The tax coefficients The number of countries included is shown in parentheses under the column headings. For coefficient estimates, t values are shown in parentheses.
decline, but they are significant at the 5 percent level and still substantial in size, 2.43 with 1992 effective tax rate alone, and 2.90 with the 1990-92 average. In addition, if the three locations with population less than one million are excluded, the tax coefficient is not affected.
The regressions in the fifth and sixth columns of Table 2 exclude countries with average effective tax rates below 7.5 percent and above 40.0 percent, leaving 48 in the sample. Surprisingly, the tax responsiveness coefficients go up. The next two columns exclude the 16 locations with GDP per capita less than $1,000. The tax responsiveness coefficients are hardly affected.
The last two columns show that the results are sensitive to the inclusion of the trade regime-tax interaction term. The tax responsiveness coefficients decline to less than half their value in Table 1 , and the coefficient based on the 1992 effective tax rate alone is significant only at the 10 percent level.
11 The tax coefficient for the 1990-92 average, however, remains significant at the 5 percent level as well as the coefficient for the inverse form of the 1992 rate used in the fourth column of Table 1 . If a very basic formulation is used, in which the only explanatory variables are GDP and the tax variable, the tax coefficient is three and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Distinguishing the trade regime becomes important when other country variables, such as GDP per capita and the regional dummies, are included.
POTENTIAL EXCLUDED VARIABLES
One issue in interpreting the tax results is whether low tax rates are correlated with other policies that promote investment, such as the provision of public goods or non-tax subsidies. On a priori grounds, the correlation between low average effective tax rates and other incentives could be either positive or negative. Greater non-tax incentives could be associated with high tax rates if a country tries to offset a high tax rate by offering nontax incentives to foreign companies.
The 1982 Benchmark Survey of Foreign Direct Investment included a set of questions that allow us to address the issue of non-tax incentives. Companies were asked to indicate whether they had received various types of incentives (or were subject to various performance requirements). Variables based on the frequency of positive responses by country were never significant and did not affect the tax coefficients. When the percentage of companies in a country stating that they had received non-tax subsidies is regressed on the 1982 average effective tax rate, the correlation is positive although not statistically significant. (The t value is about 1.5.) Thus, it appears that including non-tax incentives would increase the estimated importance of the tax variable.
It might be considered useful to include an indicator of ex ante pre-tax profitability in a location, but no valid direct measure is available. One possible indicator of expected profitability is the country's rate of GDP growth in the recent past, on the grounds that corporate profits are higher in more rapidly growing economies. When the rate of growth from 1980 to 1989, as reported in United Nations statistics, was used as an independent variable, the tax coefficient tended to become slightly larger but the growth coefficient was negative.
Finally, we consider more directly the implication of omitting a wage variable, which some researchers have found to be a significant explanatory factor (Wheeler and Mody, 1992) . If high-tax countries also have higher wages, then omitting wages might cause the importance of taxes that we report to be overstated. Ideally we would specify this relationship more fully and consider not only the role of wages but also of labor productivity in developing an appropriate labor cost variable. Because such information is not available, we instead regressed the average effective country tax rate on the measure of manufacturing wage rates reported by Wheeler and Mody. We found no statistically significant relationship. Also, when we included the wage variable as an independent variable to explain the amount of capital located in a country, it appeared to be collinear with GDP per capita; neither variable was significant, and the remaining coefficient estimates and their significance were not affected.
IMPLICATIONS FOR CAPITAL ALLOCATION
The empirical analysis has identified the distribution of MNC real capital among high and low tax countries. Can the estimated tax coefficients be interpreted as elasticities on the margin, given the increase of capital from U.S. MNCs a jurisdiction can expect if it lowers its average effective tax rate? Yes, if we assume the capital allocation structure in equation [1] , in which K j = f( t j , t A , t US , N, X j ) and there are a large number of countries, N, where an MNC can invest. Consider a country making a small cut in its tax rate so that it is just equal to the next lowest country in the tax distribution. It can expect the same investment as its neighbor now has, because the only difference between country j, which has just lowered its tax rate, and its neighbor is that country j faces a slightly lower average tax rate. That is, country j will not have competition like its former self with a tax rate just slightly above its own. But if there are many potential competitors, this effect, the change in t A , would be insignificant. The total derivative of K j with respect to t j includes a dt A /dt j term that becomes zero as N becomes very large.
As noted earlier, the actual demand for capital function may have a more complex structure, with some groups of locations being much better substitutes than others because of geographic or factor endowment proximity. Only in the case of the EC did we find that special attention to heightened tax competitiveness within a region was warranted, and therefore, we do not pursue that distinction.
If the simple choice function applies, we can make a summary calculation of the effect of differences in foreign tax rates on the allocation of U.S. MNC capital abroad. In fact, our use of a cross-section of countries in a single year makes it impossible to estimate the effect of a change in t A or t US . Nevertheless, if the U.S. tax rate is held constant while all foreign tax rates converge on the mean (leaving t A unchanged), then the estimated coefficient for t i should give the effect of each country's shift toward the mean. Using the tax response coefficient reported in Table 1 , we calculate that adjusting each tax rate to the mean host country value yields absolute differences equal to 37.6 percent of total investment. Because any reallocated capital is accounted twice, this figure suggests that almost 19 percent of capital is reallocated for tax considerations.
CONCLUSIONS
Host country average effective tax rates appear to have a highly significant effect on the location and investment decisions of U.S. manufacturing companies. This conclusion is based on country-level analysis of the international operations of more than 500 U.S. companies in 60 potential locations. The results appear to be quite robust. Tax responses remain significant when tax havens or very poor countries are excluded from the sample.
Countries with more restrictive trade policies appear to attract less U.S. investment, perhaps because trade restrictions are indicators of restrictions on business in general. Countries with restrictive trade regimes are also less able to use low taxes to attract investment. Presumably this reflects the fact that much of the output that might potentially be attracted would be sold in other markets. For countries with open trade regimes, the combined tax response elasticity, based on a higher probability of choosing to locate in a country and a larger amount of capital invested there, is approximately three. This figure is not applicable to all host countries, but if current stocks of investment are used to weight responses for each trade regime, the corresponding overall elasticity is two. Thus, most U.S. MNC capital appears to be located where foreign tax changes can substantially affect the amount of investment there. 
